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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
GUARANTY-NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF A GUARANTY-
NECESSITY OF
No two terms have caused as much confusion, promoted
as many misunderstandings, and have been used as inter-
changeably as "surety" and "guarantor." The North Dakota
Code states that "A guaranty shall mean a promise to answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person." I
"A surety is one who, at the request of another and for the
purpose of securing him a benefit, becomes responsible for
the performance by the latter of some act in favor of a third
person or hypothecates property as security therefor." I A
close study of these two definitions will reveal that "guarantor"
is the more general term than "surety." 3 Logically, then,
every problem should be approached on the assumption that
guaranty only is involved unless a basis can be found for in-
serting the particular obligation in the more limited catagory
of suretyships. 4 Most courts never distinguish between guar-
antor and surety by using the above reasoning but base the
distinction on other factors. The California Supreme Court
in Mahana v. Alexander 5 held the fundamental distinction
to be that a surety's obligation is original, while the guar-
antor's is collateral. The Mississippi Supreme Court points
out that "A surety is an insurer of the debt or obligation while
a guarantor is an insurer of the ability or solvency of the
principle." 6 It is clear that courts have adopted no common
standard in differentiating between these two terms.7
However, as much confusion arises out of the misuse of
1 N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 22-0101 (1943)
2 N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 22-0301 (1943)
3 N. D. is a Field Substantive Code State and follows a minority view.
Arnold, Outline of Suretyship and Guaranty, Sec. 9-10 (1927) states, "The
courts recognize surety to be a more general term than guarantor; and in a
statute employing the word 'surety' it will generally include guaranty, where
there is nothing in the context to limit its application." Accord, Gagen v. Stevens
4 Utah 348, 9 P. 706. Plainly the Field Code does the very reverse of this.
4 10 So. Cal. Law Rev. 371, 375 (1937)
5 88 Cal. App. 111, 263 P. 260 (1927)
8 Biship v. Currie-McGraw Co., 133 Miss. 517, 97 So. 886, 889 (1923)
7 Shore-Mueller Co. v. Palmer, 141 Ark. 64, 216 S. W. 295 (1919).
The Arkafisas court expressed the view that the contract of a surety starts
with the agreement, and that the liability of a guarantor is established for
the first time with the default of the principal debtor. Brandt on Suretyship &
Guaranty (3rd ed.) Sec. 2, states, "A surety is usually bound with his prin-
cipal by the same instrument... but the contract of a guarantor is his own
separate and a warranty that what is promised by the principal shall be done
and not merely an engagement jointly with the principal to do the thing." Accord,
Coleman v. Fuller, 105 N. C. 328, 11 S. E. 175, 8 L. R. A. 380 (1890).
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the terms in the language of the courts as by the standards
applied to them. The California Supreme Court, in discussing
this problem, points out that "guaranty" and "suretyship" are
synonymously or interchangeably used, and frequently, er-
roneously so. In many of the cases dealing with a suretyship
contract the word "guarantee" is obviously used in its col-
loquial, and not its technical sense, as, for illustration, "the
surety, by his contract, guarantees; stating the nature of the
obligation or what he has agreed to do." s The Michigan
court stated that the authorities, in discussing certain prin-
cipals common to both, often use the terms interchangeably.9
Pennsylvania solved the problem by passing a statute pro-
viding that all written agreements made by one person to
answer for the default of another shall subject such person
to the liabilities of suretyship unless such agreement shall
contain in substance the following words, "This is not in-
tended to be a contract of suretyship." 'o The Pennsylvania
court commenting on this statute pointed out that the act
was passed to clarify "guaranty" and "suretyship" as they
are frequently used interchangeably with little understanding
of the technical differences distinguishing the two." It is
apparent that the courts do not agree as to what constitutes
the technical distinction. 12 As early as 1929 Radin suggested
Arnold, Outlines of Suretyship & Guaranty, Sec. 7, 9-13. (1927)
that the distinction be abolished in California because it has
no roots in the past and no sense in the present.- Looking
about, it can be seen that other jurisdictions find many ident-
ical and indistinguishable features between the terms. Thus, in
Siben v. Green 14 the counsel for the defendant was arguing
that a distinction existed between a contract of guaranty and
of suretyship when the Court said, "We are not sure that we
see the distinction as clearly as the counsel do... " Many other
courts have failed to recognize a distinction and many have
fallen into error by using the words "guaranty" and surety-
SMahana v. Alexander, supra.
9 In re Kelley's Estate, 173 Mich. 492, 139 N. W. 250, 252 (1913). The New
Jersey court stated in Newark Finance Corp. v. Ascocella, 115 N. J. Law 388,
180 A. 862, 863 (1935) that, "The words 'guaranty' and 'surety' have frequently
been used synonymously. There is, however, a distinction.'
10 Title 8 Sec. 1, 1936 Penn. Statutes.
11 In re Wever's Estate, 317 Pa. 497, 177 A. 51 (1935).
12 Mahana v. Alexander, supra; Bishaop v. Currie-McGraw Co., supra; and
13 8 Cal. L. Rev. 21, 30 (1929).
14 8 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. 1942).
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ship" indiscriminately. 15 California in 1939 amended its
statute, abondoning the distinction."e The Louisiana Court
also does not recognize any distinction and in the leading case
of Bank & Trust Co. v. Barhet 17 the court stated that "a guar-
anty of a debt which another person owes is essentially an
obligation of suretyship, in whatever form the contract may
be worded."
The former discussion has been introductory information
to present a foundation for the discussion of a problem which
is closely related thereto. This problem involves the N. D.
Code Sec. 22-0106.' s The statute states: "A mere offer to
guaranty is not binding until notice of its acceptance is com-
municated by the guarantee to the guarantor. An absolute
guaranty is binding upon the guarantor without a notice of
acceptance." A cursory examination will reveal that there are
two forms of guaranty set forth in this statute, an offer to
guaranty and an absolute guaranty. As a general proposition
a vast number of cases dispense with notice of acceptance
when the guaranty is "absolute." '1 The use of the term "abso-
lute" is a misnomer since all guaranty and suretyship con-
tracts are conditioned on the principal's default. Also, many
courts contrast the expression with "offer of guaranty" 20
which is an invalid distinction since all guaranties are re-
vocable offers unless contractual requisites are fulfilled. 21 As
pointed out in Williston on Contracts 22 the difference between
an absolute and offer of guaranty is wholly formal. Again, an
absolute guaranty is indistinguishable from a suretyship,
where notice of acceptance also is not necessary, unless spec-
fically stated in the contract.23 The same principles seem ap-
15 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Tax Theaters Corp., 91 F. 2d 907, reversing
D. C., 15 F. Supp. 109 (1937); Riddle v. Thompson, 104 Pa. 3307 Here the as-
signors of a judgment "guaranteed payment thereof in one year from this
date." The court held that the words created a suretyship and that the as-
signors were not guarantors, but sureties.
16 Everts v. Matteson, 132 P. 2d 476, cites Calif. Code abolishing distinction
between guarantors and sureties. (Stats. 1939, Ch. 453, P. 1796 Sec. 10, amended
by Civil Code Sec. 2787, 1941).
17 177 La. 652, 148 So. 906 (1933). Accord, La-Brock v. First State Bank and
Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937).
i5 N. D. Rev. Code of 1943
19 Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. Ed. 686 (1881).
20 Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Church, 11 N. D. 420, 92 N. W. 805
(1902); Rogers Lumber Co. v. Clark, 52 N. D. 607, 204 N. W. 184 (1913); Fisk
v. Stone, 6 Dak. 35, 50 N. W. 125 (1888).
21 35 Mich. L. Rev. 529.
2- Williston on Contracts, rev. ed. Sec. 69, note 8 (1936).
23 Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 39 P. 20 (1895).
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plicable to both. Notice of acceptance given in a reasonable
time is held to be necessary by many courts.2 1 The reason given
for such notices of acceptance are: (1) the guarantor has an
opportunity to protect himself against risk ;25 (2) it is not
fair to bind the guarantor without notice being given him;-"
(3) the guarantor is entitled to know whether his offer is
accepted ;27 and (4) like other contracts the courts reason that
notice of intention is essential to mutual consent. 2 These argu-
ments seem feasible until the other side of the picture is pre-
sented. The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow the
rule that notice of acceptance was necessary because they
considered the rule contra to the elementary principles of the
law of contracts. This court pointed out, "Where the offer
contemplates the peiformance or forebearance from an act as
the consideration of the promise of the offeror, then perform-
ance or forebearance is an acceptance, unless the offeror ex-
pressly or impliedly prescribes that the acceptance must be
communicated.2 9 "The act of extending credit, standing alone
without notice to the guarantor is in itself sufficient acceptance
of his undertaking." 10 The writer believes this to be the better
rule as it is a direct application of contract law to a contract
of guaranty. However, an equitable result will not be had if
in all cases the rule of no necessity to give notice on the obli-
gee's part is applied. The Illinois Court depicts that the right to
notice is not absolute but a relative right, and the failure to
give it can only be available as a defense when it is made to
24 Davis v. Wells, supra; (For early cases in point see note 5 Col. L. Rev.
215, 223); This doctrine that notice of acceptance is required in contracts of
guaranty rests upon the dicta of Chief Justice Marshal in Russel v. Clark's
Exr's., 7 Cranch 69 (1812) and of Justice Story in Cremer v. Higgenson, 1
Mason 323, Fed. Case 3,383 (1817) ; Adams v. Jones, 12 Pet. 207, 9 L. Ed. 1058
(1838) (Another early opinion by Justice Story.)
25 Hudepohl Brewing Co. v. Bonnister, 45 F. Supp. 201 (1942) S. C.; Webb
v. Cope, 192 S. W. 934 (Mo. 1917).
26 Hunsley Paint Mfg. Co. v. Grey, 165 S. W. 2d 486 (Tex. 1942).
27 Cozzani v. Fioravanti, 51 R. I. 433, 155 A. 409 (1931).
28 Davis v. Wells, supra; M. E. Smith & Co. v. Kimble, 31 S. D. 18, 139 N. W.
348 (1906); Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Church, 11 N. D. 420, 92 N. W.
805 (1902).
29 Midland Nat. Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 151 Minn. 30, 200 N. W. 851
(1924); Taylor v. Hoke, 92 Cola. 330, 20 P. 2d 546 (1933) quoting from Clark
on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Sec. 27, "But it is held where notice is required,
knowledge or information coming to the guarantor, through any source, that
the guarantee is acting under the guaranty and extending credit on the
strength thereof, is tantamount to direct notice."
30 Midland Nat. Bank v. Security Elevator Co. supra; accord, Royal Tailors
v. Newton, 66 Utah 154, 239 P. 949 (1925) citing Frost v. Standard Metal Co.,
215 Ill. 240, 74 N. E. 139 (1905).
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appear that the guarantor has suffered some loss by such
failure.31 In Bishop v. Eaton the Massachusetts Supreme Court
stated that ordinarily there is no occasion to notify the guar-
antor of acceptance as the doing of the act is sufficient, but, if
the act is of such a kind that knowledge will not quickly come
to the guarantor, the obligee is bound to give notice of ac-
ceptance.2 The courts, holding notice of acceptance not neces-
sary, have in reality disregarded the distinction between con-
tracts of guaranty and suretyship and have applied the surety-
ship rule, that notice of acceptance is not necessary, 33 to a
contract of guaranty. What could be more logical than to
bring contracts of guaranty in harmony with suretyship law
and contract principles, the solution being the abolition of the
technical distinction between guaranty and suretyship and the
application of suretyship rules (in reality principles of con-
tracts) to both.
North Dakota, having only two cases relating to the neces-
sity of notice in contracts of guaranty, can be used to illustrate
the confusion existing among all jurisdictions in this manner.
The first decided case was Fisk v. Stone.3 4 Here a young lady
was starting a millinery business and could not obtain any
goods on credit unles payment was guaranteed. Enclosed with
an order, the new proprietor sent a letter of defendant guar-
antor which stated, "... . If you will send her goods as she
may order; not exceeding $300 due you at any one time, I will
guarantee that you are paid in full." This was held to be an
absolute guarantee by the North Dakota Supreme Court and
no notice of acceptance was necessary. Even if construed as
an offer of guaranty the court thought that having communi-
cated through the debtor the defendant waived his right to
notice of acceptance. However, in the next decided case, Parlin
v. Hall,35 the court failed to recognize an absolute guaranty.
The plaintiff sold groceries to Mrs. Hall when informed by Mr.
31 Mamerow v. National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 633, 69 N. E. 504, 507 (1903).
32 Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 500, 37 N. E. 665 (1894). Restatement of
the law of Securities Sec. 86 (1941) states the identical rule but applies it to
sureties.
33 N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 22-0304 (1943) "In interpretating the terms of a
contract of suretyship, the same rules are to be observed as in the case of
other contracts." Williston on Contracts, Sec. 68 (1920) "As to ordinary uni-
lateral contracts, the rule is that mere performance of the act required is
enough without communication."
34 6 Dak. 35, 50 N. W. 125 (1888).
35 2 N. D. 473, 52 N. W. 405 (1892).
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Hall that the defendant guaranteed payment up to $200 on any
groceries ordered. The instrument contained these words,
"... that whereas, the said party of the first part has agreed
to guaranty the grocery bill of said second party, contracted
for use on the premises hereinafter described, at any place
said second party may select to trade, not exceeding the sum
of two hundred ($200) dollars in any one season. . . The
trial court held this to be a guaranty, but, the Supreme Court
construed the rest of the instrument, in conjunction with the
part set forth above, not to be a letter of credit. The majority
opinion d'id nothing but interpret the words of the contract
to arrive at the conclusion that this was no guaranty, nor was
it specifically intended for the benefit of the plaintiff. Justice
Bartholomew dissenting, with whom the writer agrees, criti-
cizes the majority view in that they did not consider the intent
of the parties. In his dissenting opinion the judge pointed out
that Mr. and Mrs. Hall believed this to be a guaranty when
they received the instrument from the guarantor. Also the
statement of Mr. Hall to the plaintiff that the defendant had
guaranteed the grocery bill indicates the intention of the Halls
that the instrument was a guaranty. Bartholomew stated, "It
is, as I think, simply a question between a guarantor and
guarantee, and I fear that the court by its too literal adher-
ence to the strict letter of the wording has relieved appellant
of a liability that he fully intended to incur when he signed
the contract." Standard Sewing Machine Company v. Church 36
dealt with the distinction betwen an absolute and a mere offer
of guaranty. The Guaranty stated, "In consideration of your
supplying J. N. Edmunds . . . with sewing machines and
articles connected therewith on credit, do hereby guarantee
the payment of the price and value of said goods at maturity
to an amount not to exceed ($1,000) dollars,. . . this agree-
ment to be held as continuing security in your favor, and to
cover any and all renewals of the debts, notes, or acceptances
which may from time to time be made... " The guarantor
delivered this instrument to Edmunds, no agents of the plain-
tiffs being present. The court determined this instrument to
be an offer of guaranty as there was no meeting of the minds
necessary to the existence of a completed contract, hence notice
36 11 N. D. 420, 92 N. W. 805 (1902).
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of acceptance by the plaintiff must be given.37 No reasonable
man reading this instrument could possibly see a need for
notice of acceptance. By its terms the contract is for one
thousand dollars, a definite amount. Also, the phrase "this
agreement to be held as continuing security in your favor and
to cover any and all renewals of debts ...." imports the in-
terpretation of an absolute guaranty. Certainly notice of ac-
ceptance would not have to be given for each new debt re-
newed thereunder, then why is not the supplying of sewing
machines by the plaintiff acceptance of the offer and a meeting
of the minds of the parties. In Singer Manufacturing Company
v. Freeks and Propper 38 a bond was issued by guarantors in
consideration of employment of one Clement by the plaintiff
company. The bond was issued upon the request of Clement
and given by the guarantors to Clement who in turn trans-
mitted it to the plaintiffs. The trial court, applying the reason-
ing of the Standard Sewing Machine Co. Case,39 determined
this to be an offer with notice of acceptance by the plaintiffs
necessary. The Supreme Court reversed the decision holding
that when the guarantors signed the bond and left it with
Clements to deliver to the Machine Company as the bond Cle-
ment had agreed to furnish, the mutual assent was present
and no further act or notice was necessary. In reality the
the court is classifying this as an absolute guaranty or surety-
ship where notice is not necessary. The writer believes the
beter view to be set down in this case. The facts of the Standard
Sewing Machine and the Singer Manufacturing Cases are
almost identical and it is difficult to reconcil the contrasting
decisions. The trial court in Emerson Manufacturing Co. v.
Tvedt and Rustad 40 also applied the doctrine of the Standard
Sewing Machine Co. Case, however, the Supreme Court stated
that the doctrine as there set forth was inapplicable and re-
versed the decision of the trial court, holding now for the
plaintiff. Upon the back of an order made by Tvedt for certain
machinery Rustad signed the following guaranty, "In con-
sideration of one dollar to me in hand paid by Emerson Man-
ufacturing Co. (Plaintiff), the receipt which I hereby ac-
knowledge, I hereby guarantee the fulfillment of the within
37 This is the majority view but is not in accord with contract principles.
38 12 N. D. 595, 98 N. W. 705 (1904).
39 supra.
40 19 N. D. 9, 120 N. W. 1094 (1909).
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contract..." This instrument showing consideration moving
directly from the plaintiff, the guarantee, to Rustad, the
guarantor, was absolute and no notice was held necessary.
Even if the consideration was nominal or in fact never paid,
the result would not be changed, 41 mutual assent was proved,
and the delivery of the guaranty would complete the contract.
42
Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Laursen,43 contained an express waiv-
er of notice and acceptance in the instrument, hence the Su-
preme Court held notice not necessary. Even if no waiver was
present the court indicated notice would not be necessary. The
appellant, arguing notice of acceptance was necessary, ex-
pressed the view that in order to waive notice of acceptance,
there must be consideration expressed in the guaranty. It was
pointed out that when the plaintiff accepted the guaranty and
began to ship goods, thereunder, "a consideration sprang
into existence." The application of the principle, that consid-
eration arises when the guarantee acts, to the Standard Sew-
ing Machine Case 44 would change the result therein.4" Rogers
Lumber Co. v. Clark 4s again illustrates the uncertainty of the
courts in this field. Here Kunkel went to the plaintiff lumber
company to purchase some needed repairs. The plaintiff drew
up an estimate but indicated no lumber would be sold unless
Kunkel got a guaranty. Kunkel then went to the bank and
procurred the following guarantee attached to the estimate,
"Please let S. S. Kunkel have this bill of lumber, and I will
guarantee payment. Better take his note." The defendant had
the case dismissed by a directed verdict on the grounds that
the offer to guarantee was conditional and the plaintiff did
not inform the defendant of the acceptance of the offer. The
writer can see no justification for this decision as Kunkel
went to the defendant bank upon the request of the plaintiff
and when the bonds were furnished there was a meeting of the
41 Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. Ed. 686 (1881).
42 Pruden v. Liebick, 22 N. D. 591, 135 N. W. 186 (1912) in accord.
43 25 N. D. 63, 141 N. W. 64 (1908).
44 supra.
45 Note: Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Rome, 43 N. D. 433, 175 N. W.
620 (1919) was decided on the p!eadings. However, the court in dicta indicates
the following guaranty is only an offer and notice is necessary. "In considera-
tion of your taking into or continuing in, your employ Irvin E. Harris ... I
hereby agree to pay you forwith for all goods ordered.., my liability not to
exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00)." This case is not in accord with the
Fisk Case, supra; Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Laursen, supra; and Singer Mfg. Co.
Case, supra.
46 52 N. D. 607, 204 N. W. 184 (1913).
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minds and adequate consideration to form a contract.. The re-
sult obtained in the Standard Sewing Machine Company Case
was followed herein and again led the court astray from sound
principles of contracts. 47 All jurisdictions could hand down
more equitable decisions if (1) guaranty and suretyship obli-
gations were identical and (2) the rules of contracts were
applicable in all cases.
GLENN G. GEIGER
BACHELOR OF LAWS, 1948
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
7 See Fist Case, supra; Emerson Mfg. Co., supra; Rawleigh Medical Co.,
supra; and Singer Mfg. Co., supra; for contra views in North Dakota.
Note: Only other N. D. case on this matter, State of N. D. ex rel Fay Harding,
60 N. D. 703, 236 N. W. 353 (1931), distinguishes between a surety and a
guarantor, holding there was a suretyship obligation, thus notice of acceptance
was not necessary.
